Tuesday, July 6, 2010

Letter to Pastors

July 6, 2010
 
Dear Pastors:
 
From the right front seat of my Suburban on a Mountain Side in Pennsylvania outside the driveway of Dr. Denny Corle’s home, I sit. From here, I read the news from the world relative to our situation in the Islamic Terrorist war the Throat-slitting sons of Ishmael have launched on free people world wide.

To my Hebrew Friends in Israel, I would want this Tuesday morning to remind them of the "Phoney War," that "almost forgotten even" of some 70 years ago, when France carried out the disengagement of Saarland, an area surrfendered to her by a defeated Germany at the end of World War I.
 
Let me refer you to the words of Dmeetry Raizman, a former Soviet Union refusenik and Jewish activist. He has been an Israeli citizen since 1979, and has a business developing high-tech start-up apps. He was a long time supporter of the "peace process" — from the Rabin-Peres Oslo Accords up to Sharon's withdrawal from Gaza.
 
However, the Middle-East reality of recent years made radical changes in his viewpoint:

http://www.think-israel.org/raizman.1939phoneywar.html
 
Without an apparent reason, the French army withdrew from a location of strategic importance, unilaterally, without a fight, without a shot, and then for months the French forces sat in idleness. So began the Second World War.
 
On September 27, 1939, a few days before the disengagement, Hitler called a secret meeting of the General Staff and the commanders of the German military and declared: "We must immediately start preparing an attack on the West. The goal is to defeat the French."
 
The history of the subsequent German operation Fall Gelb ("Case yellow") is remembered primarily because of its consequences. The received wisdom is that the German army was strong, equipped with modern weapons and well-skilled while the French army was weak, armed with obsolete weapons, and untrained.
 
If that were indeed the case, there would be no need to be a military expert to understand the reasons for France's defeat.
 
Without taking a comprehensive tally of France's divisions and generals, several facts are readily apparent: in May 1940 there were 215 French army infantry battalions — each battalion had about 3,000 soldiers and 80 officers — for a total of 645,000 and 17,200 soldiers and officers, respectively. Furthermore, regiments from France's former colonies were part of its defenses: 14 battalions of French soldiers from colonies in North Africa, 42 battalions of Algerian troops, and 59 battalions from Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, Madagascar and the United India — China.
 
Together with the Foreign Legion Infantry France had 1,130 battalions. The French generals, roughly, had available to them 1.2 million infantrymen and more than 30 thousand officers.
 
French armored corps included 430 fast and strong Somua S35 Tanks and 403 armored Char B1 and Char B1-bis tanks, which, at that time, were considered the best tanks in Western Europe. 1650 Renault R35/40s tanks constituted another armored force. Strength and quality of armor munitions (artillery guns) requirements for French tanks came from German models.
 
Toward the end of 30s, the French modernized the cavalry into motorized divisions that consisted of motorcycles, small vehicles, Kegresse half-tracks and Citroen-Panhard AMD trucks. French divisions against German Cavalry were also equipped with tanks: 100 Somua S35 tanks, about 100 Hotchkiss H39 and 70 AMR35 Renaults.
 
The French artillery had always been considered a huge steel force. German General Erich Ludendorff expressed its strength, saying, "How I hate the French guns!" This force numbered 409 battalions equipped with approximately eleven thousand artillery pieces.
 
At the individual armament level, French infantrymen carried automatic weapons equipped with an excellent Chatellerault FM, a semi-automatic rifle and a modern design of the MAS36, a Berthier which, although older, was improved in 1936.
 
In 1939, European military experts had a great appreciation for France's military power and considered its army one of the strongest in the world.
 
Therefore, trying to explain its military defeat by referencing a weak and outdated military is unacceptable. The opposite was true: France had the best military in the region and it had a well-equipped army, not only to defend against the Germans, but also to win. Why did France fall?
In these days, filled as they are with the reprecussions of the Goldstone report, with recent discoveries of scandalous anti-Israeli activities by the New Israel Fund, with days of appeasement, with days of doubts of Israeli right to fight against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, with days dithering about withdrawal from the Golan Heights — is there anything to be learned from events far away in the stale pages of history The events in France in 1939-1940? Are they relevant?
 
A Concept which the French followed spawned the French Strategy!
 
France fell because she was a captured by a misconception. Marshal Henri Philippe P
étain, the pride of the French nation, its number one soldier, the legendary winner of the Battle of Verdun in 1916, a hero of World War I, head of the defense establishment, was the father of the misconception.
 
All the strategies taught by French military academies, the legacy of battle experience, the wisdom of fighting, the principles, the tactics, and the acts of heroism, Marshall P
étain condensed into one simple formula: minimization of losses. Pétain defined the guiding criterion for the army: "We must prevent the losses the nation suffered during World War I".
 
Victory in battle? War? Subduing the enemy? Sacrifice for the homeland? No more! Now — just the minimization of losses.
 
This misconception gave rise to a defensive strategy, and a defensive strategy gave rise to the "Maginot Line" — the barricade that will guard France ... Hello!
 
A "Peace process" penetrated all aspects of French military doctrine: it paralyzed the strategic thinking of senior command and dictated all aspects of preparing the military-force structure, training, and the operational programs of the Joint Chiefs.
 
A debilitating "peace process" influenced the majority. However, some individuals understood where France's choice of peace would lead, including General Jean Baptiste Eug
ène Estienne, a French armored soldier who tried to promote the idea of putting a center tank formation as an offensive rather than defensive force.
 
After the idea was rejected, young lieutenant colonel Charles de Gaulle tried to place a similar idea on the agenda. The French government, however, rejected his plan as "contrary to the global French strategy" of defense for peace.
 
French General Staff operational plans for 1940 said: "avoid at all costs significant operations on the German front."
 
The alternative raised by France and her allies was a strategy of economic sanctions meant to deter Germany from taking aggressive steps.
 
The "peace process" gained momentum. In early October 1939, after the disengagement from Saarland, a journalist visited the French military on the front and wrote: "Wonderful peace and quiet prevail here — our artillery is located on the banks of the Rhine, nonchalantly looks over animated German trains and ammunition shells, all within range of our guns.
 
Pilots hover over our enemies' factories without dropping bombs." The main task of the French General Staff was not to harass the Germans, "not to be dragged into provocations."
 
Enemies? Germany joined "the peace process" with great joy. Its army had gained strength. Field Marshal Kesselring wrote about those days: "Fortunately the enemy had discovered absolute passivity and allowed us, prior to May 1940, to close the gaps and deficiencies by equipping and arming Germany."
 
On October 18, the senior command of the German Army published Order No. 7 instructing German forces to avoid any military action on the Western Front. The Wehrmacht was interested in hudna.
 
Did the Allies understand the absurdity and the danger in a French-German "peace process"? When a member of the Conservative Party British Cabinet, F. C. Amery, proposed to drop bombs on German phosphorus forests, Sir Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for Air, answered him: "Come on, it is possible, but if you want to damage private property, maybe we will bomb the Ruhr mining region?"
 
Before his death in 1943, Sir Kingsley Wood saw bombs falling on London — German bombs manufactured from the steel of the Ruhr.
The "Phoney War" led to despair and took away the French military's morale. French troops did not understand why they did not fight if they declared war? Gradually they lost the desire to serve and saw their presence on the front line as counterproductive and pointless.
 
When the morale worsened, the French command was forced to turn to the government, on November 21, 1939, to get a ministerial decision regarding the establishment of an "entertainment force." On November 30 the French Parliament discussed increasing the alcohol ration to soldiers, and in February 1940 the Prime Minister signed an order canceling a tax on gambling in the army.
 
Additionally, the government decided to purchase ten thousand soccer balls to keep the army on the front pacified.
 
Not only the soldiers at the front, but also the citizens at home stopped understanding what was happening, why there were soldiers in the army, and what was the government's policy.
 
Well, was army Secretary Pétain really the "destroyer" of France in June 1940? Yes, but he was not the only one. There is another factor that "contributed" just as much if not more to France's defeat: at the beginning of October 1939, the leftist bloc demanded an extraordinary meeting of parliament for an urgent discussion of a "peace process". The left representatives wrote to the Parliament Speaker: "With all our strength, we strive for peace, achievable peace; we believe that the peace process can bring peace."
 
With Nazi Germany at the gate accruing power, the French left had its say: "We believe that peace is achievable, we call collectively to strive to achieve mutual confidence between all parties in Europe."
Although the French left sought peace, it was not the architect of the "peace process" in Europe on the eve of the German invasion of France.
 
The Left only executed instructions from abroad. Instructions from the "directors" of the Peace Festival, "owners" of the real enlightened left, tried at the same time to neutralize the Allies, to erode the resolve to fight Germany, and to lull the public opinion by the propaganda of peace.
 
And when fighting for peace, all means are acceptable. As an honored tradition, the "peace camp" mixed legal means (parliament, press, freedom of speech with underground activities — from strikes at plants of military necessity to direct sabotage of tanks, cannons, and aircraft on the production lines.
 
France fell victim to two parallel processes: an ideological sabotage by the extreme left-wing minority in France that was organized, guided, and funded by hostile interested parties abroad, and a consequent "second wave", a much wider process consisting of "striving for peace" and a preference for "minimizing losses" if there is no choice whether to fight.
Was the French leadership completely blind to what was happening? The French government eventually sobered up and realized it was suffering ideological sabotage and subject to extensive hostile action designed to topple the French interior.
 
Indeed, a ban was imposed on the distribution of left-wing newspapers, extreme left organizations were "outlawed," and leftist deputies were removed from all institutions and committees. But the French government's measures were too little, too late.
 
Subsequent events show that the left's ideological sabotage caused France irreversible destruction:
 
The Phoney War ended on May 10, 1940, following a large-scale German offensive that instantly defeated France.
The most powerful army in the region before the war, detachment, a general that is a former national hero and head of a security establishment that avoids fighting and preaches minimizing losses, a defensive line misconception, an extreme left driving the "struggle for peace" under the direction and financing of hostile elements abroad, a broad public drifting into the whirlpool of a "peace process", decadence and despair among soldiers and civilians — are these the indicators of the next Israeli war? [end of article]
 
Relative to that "Phoney War" and how the Nazis almost defeated the world, we face the Ishmaelite throat-slitters, and in his speech Thursday, President Obama assured us that our "southern border is more secure today than at any time in the past 20 years." [http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article/539337/201007021859/Shootout-At-El-Paso-City-Hall.aspx]

Obama does that in spite of the fact that El Paso's City Hall is taking rifle fire from Mexico?
 
The president made his pitch for "comprehensive immigration reform" by assuring us problems on the border were already taken care of, so the next course of action was a modified amnesty program for 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. YES, SO THAT THEY CAN RE-ELECT HIM AS "MOHAMMEDAN-IN-CHIEF!"
 
But a funny thing happened on the same day he was urging Americans to go along: El Paso's City Hall found itself in a war zone as gunfire from the Mexican side from either traffickers or the Mexican lawmen trying to fight them pocked the edifice. News reports said as many as seven bullets hit the building. No one was hit — this time.
 
It's another sign of the horror in Mexico spilling onto the U.S. side.
 
Further down the border on the same day, 12 miles from Nogales, Ariz., 21 people were massacred in a fight between rival smuggling gangs over the right of way to bring their illegal immigrant "shipments" and narcotics into the U.S.
 
It all gives the president's assurances to Americans that the border situation is being dealt with an aura of unreality.
 
Statistics can be cut a number of ways, and some areas do have better border security.
 
But the fact that it's uneven has left other areas — such as the Arizona border, more vulnerable as traffickers fight over the last remaining routes with intensity.
 
And dramatic events are happening across the border area anyway that suggest bottoms dropping out, with horrors unimaginable in the past becoming the new norm:
 
• The U.S. has lost control of actual U.S. territory to drug and migrant smugglers as much as 80 miles inland in Arizona. Any American who enters this area risks being shot dead.
• The Falcon Dam on Texas' lower Rio Grande was targeted for destruction by a Mexican cartel to destroy a rival's drug and alien-smuggling route. Had the foiled plot succeeded, 4 million people could have ended up downriver with mass casualties and deaths.
• Arizona now has the second-highest kidnapping rate in the world, behind only Mexico City, with nearly all of it due to drug and migrant smugglers and their quests for cash and territory.
• Mass graves have been discovered in New Mexico, believed by lawmen to be the work of cartels.
• Two U.S. border consulates have been attacked, and three people connected with them have been killed in the past three years.
• In Washington state and others, national forests and Indian reservations have seen large swaths of land converted by cartels to drug cultivation operations guarded by illegal immigrants, making them also no-man's lands.
 
Now the Mexican shootout that hits a large U.S. city, and it's hard not to question how much urgency the White House has.
 
Obama's speech is a case in point, with amnesty for the illegals taking priority over border security.
 
That comes as a Fox News poll Friday showed 59% of Americans favor securing the border before dealing with amnesty.
 
Obama did say he was sending 1,200 National Guard troops to the Arizona border, but the Guardsmen are there to perform clerical tasks — not to protect and defend.
 
Meanwhile, even as the drug war spills over our border, the U.S. has given just $310 million to aid Mexico's fight this year through the Merida Initiative, and only $720 million in 2009, given the era of multibillion-dollar boondoggles?
 
The cash given so far has performed productively already, according to an analysis by Shannon O'Neil in Americas Quarterly, citing the intelligence-sharing and cooperation in 2009 that brought down two cartel kingpins, as well as the coordinated bust of 300 traffickers on both sides of the border last October.
 
With the war hitting our border now, it's time to finance more such success.
 
But all we're seeing is a can't-do attitude and a lack of urgency. Homeland Security chief Janet Napolitano's recent declaration: "You're never going to totally seal that border," doesn't suggest any sense that there's an emergency here, even as the depravities of Mexico's criminal cartels penetrate ever deeper into the U.S.
 
When does it become urgent for our government? [end of article]
 
From AMERICAN History, let me give you a case of "urgency!" If you Pastors know ole JAV, you know that he is a student of History.
 
In the last fall of the Civil War, the fall of 1864, The Comanche Indians, Kiowas, and even the Navajos, were nailing Anglo-Americans as the Federal troops were all involved in the Civil War fighting the Southerners. Collectively, these Indians were effecting the shedding of much blood in the same area of our country where that city hall was hit by rifle fire I mention above.
 
Federal Colonel Kit Carson of the New Mexico Territorials had crushed the Navajos. Carson’s superior, General James H. Carleton. He then became ready to turn the Army’s attention to the Commanches and Kiowas, who had, all that year, raised havoc along the Sante Fe Trail.
 
Angry bands of Southern Plains Indians, as the Commanches and Kiowas were called, had threatened to cut completely the route of the Sante Fe Trail between the East, Missouri, and the West. During 1864 every wagon train proceeding down the Canadian River to New Mexico had been attacked. Even the large and powerful wagon trains lost horses and oxen to those raiding Amerindians. small wagon trains, whether military or civilian, had been massacred.
 
In October ‘64, therefore, Carleton received orders to restore full communications and to "punish the savages" as the then terminology was, for the depredations. Consequently, General Carleton authorized Colonel Kit Carson to sweep through the valley of the Canadian with a strong force of New Mexico and California "territorials" who were civilians that had signed up for a "militia type duty" rather than "army type duty."

Scouts had revealed that large numbers of Commanches and Kiowas were wintering on the rich Buffalo plains of the Texas Panhandle, right where this ole man grew up as a poor boy. Furthermore, Carleton believed that the Indians would not be prepared to fight a winter campaign.
 
Therefore, Colonel Kit Carson and his Territorials rode out of Cimarron, New Mexico, in early November 1874. In his number were over 300 mounted territorials with 72 Ute and Jicarilla Apache scouts and auxiliaries. The Utes and Apaches were promised scalps and plunder from their "up til then ravaging them Commanches!" Carson was well supplied: He had a well-stocked wagon train of twenty-seven wagons and six thousand rounds of ammunition.

He was also furnished with two excellent little 12-pounder mountain howitzers, fitted on special traveling carriages. [Had Custer not been so proud and arrogant, at a later day, he would not have left his Gatling guns and howitzers behind.]
 
Carson’s column followed Ute Creek to where it pours into the Canadian, then rode east into the high Texas plains along the broad, flat river bottoms. The scouts went far ahead. At night, Carson camped among tall cottonwoods in the gulches or canadas.
 
At Sundown on November 24, 1864, the Scouts reported an encampment about a day’s march to the east, near the old, abandoned Bent and St. Vrain trading post on a small tributary of the Canadian, known as Adobe Walls, from its still standing sun-dried brick structures. Carson at once marched toward the Indians, pushing his column through the frosty night for fifteen miles, allowing no fires nor smoking during rest breaks.
Colonel Carson was in sight of the Comanche encampment at daybreak.
 
Lt. George Pettis of the California volunteers, the officer in charge of the two-gun twelve-pound Mountain Howitzers, and Carson pointed out to him the sun-bleached tipis of the Plains Indians. The Utes reported a camp or village of 176 tipis. Without scouting farther down the river valley, Carson detached his baggage train with a guard of 75 men, and with a squadron of some 250 cavalry attacked across the 2-mile wide valley toward the village.
 
The Ute and Jicarilla auxiliaries left the column and tried to steal the enemies’ horse herd. The camp, which was Kiowa Apache, was alerted before the cavalry reached it. The warriors formed a skirmish line to cover the flight of the women and children, who abandoned the tip-is and ran for the ridges behind the river. The Nermernuh Commanches knew their tactics well when being attacked by Horse Soldiers.
 
What Colonel Carson did not know, however, was that Kiowa Comanche Chieftain, To ‘hau-sen, Little Mountain, also called Sierrito and Dohasan] was in the encampment. Dohasan organized the defense immediately, while also sending for help from Comanche and Kiowa lodges further downstream that Carson was blissfully ignorant of their presence too. Dohasan rallied the Commanches and their swirling, shooting horsemen slowed the white attack and assured the women’s escape. Dohasan exhibited great bravery with his horse being shot out from under him, but, his braves rescued him, and he rallied his warriors.
 
Carson’s Cavalry pushed the retreating Kiowa Commanches for about four miles, finally reaching the Adobe Walls buildings. Here, more and more Indians kept appearing. The Territorials dismounted and sheltered their horses behind the trading post, and began their skirmishing on foot.
 
When Colonel Carson and Lt. Pettis arrived with the Howitzer Battery, now, the old mountain man, and the inexperienced Lieutenant, saw, to their dismay, another camp of some 500 tipis rising less than a mile away.
 
This was a Comanche encampment, and hundreds of warriors were streaming from it across the prairie. Pettis counted "twelve or fourteen hundred." The Indians formed a long line across the rides, painting their faces while their chiefs harangued them.
 
The Kiowas, who too, were arriving in large numbers, roared the battle sons of their warrior societies. Pettis feared that the horde would charge the white squadron at any moment.
 
The ole mountain man Carson ordered Pettis to throw a few shells at the mob of Indians. The howitzers were unlimbered, wheeled around, and fired in rapid succession. The shells, screaming over the warriors’ heads and bursting just beyond them, seemed to startle the Indians badly. Yelling, the host moved precipitously out of range.
 
Unfortunately, Colonel Carson thought the battle was over, and told his troops accordingly, then ordering his horses watered at Bent’s Creek.

Within an our, thousands of warriors surrounded the trading post, circling and firing from under their horses' bellies. Surprisingly, most of the warriors appeared to be equipped with good repeating rifles, which the Mexican and French arms dealers had traded them. The Savages swirled about for several hours, not daring to press too close, while the howitzers killed many.
 
Colonel Carson had marched unwittingly into a vast winter-concentration of the tribes on the southern bison range. Carson, with a split command, then began to worry about his wagon trains. His rear detachment, without cannon, would almost certainly be overwhelmed if the enemy discovered it. Carson then made a cautious, and yet quite sensible decision: to break out of Adobe Walls and regroup with his supply column, which had his food and ammunition.
 
The Cavalry mounted and retreated behind the fires of the battery, which stayed constantly in action. The Indians set fire to the grass, however, this helped, because the smoke concealed Carson’s retiring column.
 
About sundown the whites arrived back in the deserted Kiowa Apache camp, where Pettis noted that the Ute women accompanying them had mutilated the corpses of several dead Kiowa Apaches. Carson ordered those tipis-lodges set on fire. Then, under the cover of darkness, he moved out toward his wagons, with which he rejoined about three hours later.
 
The next day, because of those two Howitzers, the Indian Mob—thousands of them—still held back. Some of the territorial officer besought Carson to take up the attack, but, instead, he ordered a withdrawal. The odds were much too great; Carson, who later wrote that he had never seen Indians who fought with such dash and courage until they were shaken by his artillery, did not make the error of despising horse Indians.
 
He had so far lost only a few dead, and a handful of wounded, whiles his howitzers had inflicted heavy losses, killing and wounding about 200 Indians. Carson wrote and claimed a victory later.
 
Privately, he thought himself lucky to have extricated his command. In fact, the howitzers and his own caution had probably saved him and his command from Custer’s fate later on the Little Big Horn.
 
The Kiowas and Commanches told some Comancheros who were in the Indian camps at the time that except for the "guns that shot twice," the twin howitzer battery, they would have killed every white man in the valley of the Canadian. Carson himself said as much to Lt. Pettis.
 
Carson’s recommendation up the Chain of Command was a resumption of "Indian War" but, with at least a thousand troops, who, he thought, would destroy the Indian concentration in winter.
 
The Military Authorities were planning extensive, determined operations from Kansas to New Mexico, when the sudden collapse of the Confederacy changed everything again. The Plains Indians had gotten a reprieve at the beginning of the Civil War. They received another within that decade with the "drawdown" which was effected after the Confederacy collapsed.
 
History’s lessons sometimes are harsh. Anglo-Americans continued to be brutalized by the Plains Indians with thousands more dying and hundred being carried into degrading captivity.
 
In Israel recently, I disbursed several books about Indian Warfare in America, all the way from Daniel Boone, here in Pennsylvania, where I now sit in my suburban, out to where I was born and raised as a boy. My advice to the Israelis was, this is what you will have to do to your Ishmaelite enemies if you are to prevail. If you continue to allow them "sanctuary" and continue to listen to "Mohammedans" like our "Muslim-in-chief" in the White House, it shall be a very costly affair till Yeshua, your Messiah, does in fact, return, as HE has promised that HE will!!!! I wonder what’s going on in the White House right now in the Meeting between Bibi and Obama?
 
JIM VINEYARD
YEDIDIM OF ISRAEL
www.YedidimofIsrael.com
http://www.jav-yedidimofisrael.blogspot.com/

JAV:la

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